Key Takeaways
- AUM growth strong but masked by attrition: AUM grew 24% YoY on 32% disbursement growth, but elevated BT-out attrition of 21-22% muted the headline AUM build.
- NIM under pressure from portfolio yield: NIM fell 10 bps YoY, and portfolio yield compressed 60 bps YoY to 9.3% as competition forced lower pricing on new acquisitions and the existing book faced attrition.
- Credit cost normalizes from an unsustainably low base: Annualized credit costs rose to 18 bps from 2 bps a year ago, but the prior year included COVID provision releases; the normalized comparable was 14 bps.
- Margin guidance held despite rate-cut expectations: Full-year NIM compression guidance of 15-20 bps is reaffirmed, absorbing both portfolio yield attrition and an expected December rate cut.
- What to watch next quarter: Whether AUM growth recovers toward medium-term guidance as rate stabilization takes hold, the pace of near-prime scaling, and any H2 assignment activity to manage PBC mix.
AUM Growth & the Attrition Overhang
- Disbursement engine running hot: Disbursements grew 32% YoY across all product segments, with LRD the fastest at 35% and LAP at 29%, yet AUM growth was muted because elevated BT-out attrition drained the book faster than new loans filled it.
- Attrition spike driven by market pricing: BT-out attrition jumped to 21-22% from 15-16% last year, with borrowers largely moving to PSU banks offering aggressive rates. Management declined to break out attrition by segment or provide an industry-level benchmark.
- Recovery thesis tied to rate stabilization: Management expects the market to stabilize within three to four months after one more anticipated rate cut in December, allowing AUM growth to return to medium-term guidance by next year.
- Competition now structural, not cyclical: PSU bank competition in prime home loans is described as "the feature rather than the novelty," meaning the strategy must adapt permanently through deeper micro-market presence and product nuance rather than pricing or payouts.
Jain: "We take in prime home loan now the competition is going to be the feature rather than the novelty."
Margin Walk & Yield Pressure
- Portfolio yield eroded on two fronts: Yield fell 60 bps YoY to 9.3% because new acquisitions are being booked at lower pricing and the existing portfolio faces attrition pressure concentrated in home loans and construction finance.
- Cost of funds providing partial offset: Cost of funds improved 50 bps YoY and 34 bps sequentially as policy rate transmission flowed through existing and incremental borrowings, with roughly 10 bps of further benefit expected through the rest of the year.
- Gross spread bump is temporary: The 10 bps sequential improvement in gross spread to 1.9% reflected a timing mismatch where cost-of-funds benefits flowed through faster than portfolio rate adjustments; management expects this to normalize.
- Full-year NIM guidance intact at 15-20 bps decline: The compression factors in ongoing attrition pressure and an expected 25 bps repo rate cut in December, where the COF benefit would be marginal relative to the yield hit on the floating-rate book.
Kalani: "On a full year basis, we are expecting to be in this guidance range only because of the compression we are seeing driven by attrition pressure across the portfolio especially in the home loan side, also in the construction finance side."
Asset Quality & Credit Cost
- GNPA improved despite credit cost normalization: GNPA fell 4 bps to 26 bps and NNPA improved 1 bps to 12 bps, with stage 1 assets at 99.39%. The 18 bps annualized credit cost compares against an artificially low 2 bps in Q2 FY25 that included COVID overlay releases; the normalized prior-year figure was 14 bps.
- Near-prime book deliberately slow initially: The affordable housing SBU was taken slowly over its first 15-18 months to learn the different underwriting nuances versus prime retail, but is now scaling faster at roughly ₹250 crores per month in acquisitions.
- Management declined to disclose 1+ DPD: When asked for early-bucket delinquency data, management stated flatly that 1+ DPD is not a metric they report, pointing only to the 30 DPD number.
Liability Management & Assignment Strategy
- Borrowing mix shifting toward money markets: The share of NCDs and CP rose while bank borrowing and NHB refinance declined, driven purely by cost benefit in the current rate environment.
- Assignment income dropped by design, not distress: Management made a conscious decision to pause treasury-driven ALM assignment because last year's bond-buying lengthened the ALM profile and current leverage is low, so no ALM match pressure exists. Assignment for PBC management remains a live option for H2 if non-HL origination outpaces the ability to hold it on balance sheet.
- Net total income growth lagged NII: Net total income grew 22% versus NII growth of 34%, with the gap explained by lower fair-value changes and the deliberate reduction in assignment income.
Jain: "It is always a sound strategy in our assessment in a mortgage to have a certain percentage of assets always being assigned out to have a perfect ALM match."
Operating Efficiency & Return Profile
- Opex ratio improved on digital adoption: Opex to NTI improved to 19.6% from 20.5% YoY, supported by 94% e-agreement penetration and 93% online onboarding. Management sees this ratio as flattish or improving 1-1.5% YoY in a falling-rate environment, with a 14-15% target over the next three to four years as the rate cycle turns and income expands.
- ROE declined on three structural factors: ROE fell to 12.2% from 13.3% because of the FY25 capital raise diluting equity, the absence of COVID overlay releases that flattered the prior year, and lower income from derecognized loans.
- Fee income grows with the book, not as a deliberate lever: Insurance income is the predominant driver, plus bounce, foreclosure, and switch charges. Near-prime business carries higher fee penetration, but management characterized the growth as in line with business volumes rather than a conscious NIM-plus-fee strategy.
Product Mix & Competitive Positioning
- LRD is a differentiated HFC offering: LRD grew disbursements at 35% and is a product most HFCs do not offer at scale; Bajaj may be the only HFC competing meaningfully against the full universe of PSU and private banks. Competition is more intense than in home loans because customers are evolved and have access to all large lenders.
- No internal LRD cap beyond regulation: Management will not impose a ceiling below the regulatory 40% non-residential limit. At the AUM level, growth can continue as long as assignment capacity exists; the automatic ceiling applies only at the asset-recognition level.
- HFC cost parity with banks is a structural belief: Management argued that a well-run AAA-rated HFC is not at a cost disadvantage versus banks once all expenses including CASA mobilization and compliance are considered, citing HDFC's decades of dominance as proof.
- Non-prime and construction finance are return-mix necessities: The model is "scale, low risk and reasonable return," not low return. Non-prime and construction finance are essential to the balance-sheet mix to deliver that reasonable return, while the dominant part remains prime plus LRD.
Jain: "I don't think a well-run company at a AAA level is at a disadvantage versus a bank to be able to compete in the prime space. If that would have been the case, Bobby, then what we have seen for years, for decades in the country, HDFC..."
Guidance & Commitments
| Commitment | Specifics | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Full-year NIM compression | 15-20 bps decline, factoring in attrition pressure and expected December rate cut | FY26 full year |
| Cost of funds benefit | ~10 bps further reduction from remaining policy transmission | Balance of FY26 |
| AUM growth recovery | Return to medium-term AUM growth guidance after rate stabilization | By next year (FY27) |
| Opex to NTI target | 14-15% as rate cycle turns and income expands | 3-4 years |
| Target leverage of 7.5x | Gearing to reach 7.5x, dependent on growth trajectory | 2 to 2.5 years |
| Near-prime scaling | Currently acquiring ~₹250 crores/month; expect much faster pace | Next year (FY27) |
| H2 assignment activity | Open to assignment depending on ability to mobilize non-HL business | H2 FY26 |
| Parent stake dilution | Time available for parent to dilute per regulatory guidelines | Until September 2029 |
Key Metrics
| Metric | Q2 FY26 |
|---|---|
| AUM | ₹1,26,749 cr, +24% YoY |
| Disbursements | ₹15,914 cr, +32% YoY from ₹12,000 cr in Q2 FY25 |
| Net interest income | +34% YoY |
| Net total income | +22% YoY |
| PAT | ₹643 cr, +18% YoY from ₹546 cr in Q2 FY25 |
| Annualized ROA | 2.3%, vs 2.5% in Q2 FY25 |
| Annualized ROE | 12.2%, vs 13.3% in Q2 FY25 |
| Net worth | ₹21,170 cr as of 30th September 2025 |
| Portfolio yield | 9.3%, -60 bps YoY and -22 bps QoQ |
| Cost of funds | 7.4%, -50 bps YoY and -34 bps QoQ |
| Gross spread | 1.9%, flat YoY; +10 bps QoQ |
| Net interest margin | 4.0%, flat QoQ; -10 bps YoY |
| Opex to NTI | 19.6%, vs 20.5% in Q2 FY25; -90 bps YoY |
| GNPA | 0.26%, improved 4 bps QoQ |
| NNPA | 0.12%, improved 1 bps QoQ |
| Annualized credit cost | 18 bps, vs 2 bps in Q2 FY25; normalized Q2 FY25 credit cost would have been 14 bps excluding overlay release |
| Provisioning coverage ratio | ~56%, in line with previous quarter |
| CAR | 26.12% |
| PBC criteria (individual home loan) | 50.45% as of 30th September 2025, against regulatory threshold of 50% |
| Home loan portfolio IRR | 8.6% |
| LAP portfolio IRR | 10.3% |
| LRD portfolio IRR | ~8.1%-8.2% |
| Developer finance portfolio IRR | ~11.5% |
| Aggregate portfolio IRR | 9.26% |
| Home loan annualized attrition (including BT-out) | 21%-22%, up from 15%-16% last year |
| BT-in as share of home loan acquisition | 15%, industry at 16%-17% |
| Near-prime/affordable SBU monthly acquisition | ~₹250 cr per month |
| Home loan book mix: prime vs non-prime | 86:14, non-prime includes affordable |
| Stage 1 assets | 99.39%, improved 3 bps QoQ |
| Stage 2 assets | 0.34%, flat QoQ |
| Borrowing mix: money market | 54% |
| Borrowing mix: bank borrowing | 37% |
| Borrowing mix: NHB refinance | 9% |
| E-agreement penetration | 94% in September 2025 |
| Online customer onboarding penetration | 93% in September 2025 |
| Geographical coverage | 176 locations, 220 branches |
| H1 FY26 PAT growth | +19% YoY |
| H1 FY26 annualized ROA | 2.3% |
| H1 FY26 annualized ROE | 11.9% |
| H1 FY26 credit cost | 17 bps, vs 4 bps in H1 FY25 (H1 FY25 included ₹50 cr overlay release) |
| H1 FY26 opex to NTI improvement | 40 bps vs H1 FY25 |
| Medium-term GNPA guidance | 40-60 bps |
| Medium-term credit cost guidance | 20-25 bps |
| Target gearing | 7x-8x, median 7.5x; expected in 2-2.5 years |
| Opex to NTI medium-term aspiration | 14%-16%, expected in 3-4 years |
| Parent (Bajaj Finance) holding | 88%; dilution timeline by September 2029 per regulatory guidelines |