Key Takeaways
- Parivartan disruption overshadows a milestone quarter: AUM crossed INR10,400 crores for the first time, but the repayment-model change across 730 branches caused a disbursement shortfall, a GNPA rise to 1.61%, and a PPOP decline. Management calls it a temporary inconvenience and expects normalization in 3–4 months.
- The weekly-model bet is now existential: Project Parivartan is the foundation for scaling to INR28,000 crores by FY28; the disruption is concentrated in Parivartan branches, which contribute 61% of SMA and 56% of GNPA despite being a smaller portion of the book.
- Credit cost is a tale of two books: BAU credit cost runs at 1.4% and is guided to stay below 2%, but total credit cost of 2.9% includes a 1.5% non-credit loss from legacy 2018–19 vintages that is now largely over, with a ~INR60 crore tail still to come.
- Growth ambition is undimmed: FY25 targets of INR15,000 crores AUM, ROA above 4.5%, and NIM above 13.5% were reiterated, with weekly branches expected to drive 40–45% of disbursements by the same time next year.
- What to watch next quarter: Whether the 49,000 SMA borrowers from Parivartan branches regularize as promised, the pace of the remaining ~INR60 crore legacy credit-cost tail, and any sign that the second wave of non-Parivartan branches is being prepped for conversion.
Project Parivartan: The Disruption and the Bet
- What changed: Repayment scheduling shifted from fixed monthly dates to a day-based cycle across 730 branches covering 0.16 crore customers and ~INR5,500 crores of portfolio, as a precursor to a full weekly-collection model.
- The immediate damage: Missed scheduled repayment dates forced staff to revisit customers, wasting productive time and compressing the October disbursement cadence by INR400–450 crores. Q3 disbursement landed at INR2,543 crores (8% YoY, 1% QoQ) versus a potential INR2,800–3,000 crores.
- Asset quality hit is Parivartan-specific: 49,000 borrowers in the SMA bucket (61% of SMA AUM) and 38,000 borrowers in GNPA (56% of GNPA) came from Parivartan branches. GNPA rose from 1.4% to 1.61%. Management sees no difference in underlying asset quality between Parivartan and non-Parivartan branches; the disruption is a collections-process problem, not a credit-quality problem.
- Recovery is already visible: 48% of flows remain in the 1–30 day bucket and are expected to regularize. Disbursement returned to normal in November and December after the October hit.
- The second wave is on hold: Non-Parivartan branches will not be converted until the current 730 branches are fully regularized, and management says it is wiser by experience and will not repeat the approach unless fully calibrated.
Saxena: "We are doing it because we want to take the company to an immediate 15,000 and an eventual 28,000 by FY'28. The model, which was, at that time, prevalent, which we are attempting to change, obviously, was not a scalable model."
Asset Quality and Credit Cost
- BAU credit cost is contained: The ongoing portfolio runs at a 1.4% credit cost, and management expects it to remain below 2%.
- The legacy drag is fading: Total credit cost of 2.9% includes a 1.5% non-credit loss component from historical 2018 and 2019 vintages. This is a one-time item, now largely over, with a ~INR60 crore tail expected over the next 1–3 quarters.
- Recovery progress is tracking below target: Nine-month recoveries reached INR71–72 crores against an original target of INR125 crores. Management expects to cross INR100 crores this year but may not reach INR120 crores. Next year's recovery target is INR150 crores.
- Parivartan regularization timeline: Management is confident the disruption will regularize in the next 3–4 months, with pain visible for at most one more quarter.
- SMA concentration is the near-term risk: The elevated SMA bucket is driven by missed installments from Parivartan branches, and provisioning within the 1–90 day bucket has risen accordingly.
Saxena: "This was, however, a temporary inconvenience for a better tomorrow. We, as a management team, are very clear on it."
The Weekly Model Thesis
- The strategic logic: The joint liability group model works better with weekly repayment because the installment size is one-fourth of the monthly amount, reducing default risk in crises. Weekly-model companies delivered cost-to-AUM of about 5.5%, and in past disruptions like demonetization and COVID, the weekly model recovered first.
- Tenure shift is already underway: Two years ago, 100% of the book was 24-month loans. Now 83% is 24 months and 17% is 12- and 18-month tenures. In weekly branches, the mix is reversed: 88% is 12–18 months and 12% is 24 months.
- The cost concern is dismissed: Management argues the fear that weekly collection costs more is a misnomer, because monthly models still require conveyance for new customer acquisition and missed-installment collection.
- Customer profile is unchanged: The underlying borrower, a daily wage earner or small shopkeeper with a grocery, tailoring, garage, cattle-farming or milk business, is the same regardless of repayment cycle.
- Ticket size versus indebtedness: Management pushes back on ticket-size comparisons, noting that three loans of INR30,000 in a year still mean lower indebtedness than one loan of INR40,000 from a competitor.
Saxena: "I will flip this and say that in times of disruption, be it your demonetization or bit it your COVID, in times of a crisis, the weekly model is the first to come out of that crisis because of the inherent size of the liability."
Growth, Geography and Customer Franchise
- Customer acquisition is accelerating: 3.4 lakh new customers were added during the year (56% YoY), and 9.5 lakh in the first nine months (112% growth). The total customer base reached 0.3 crore (32% YoY, 10% QoQ).
- Geographical concentration is being unwound: The top two states, MP and Orissa, have been reduced from 16.5% at takeover to 14% each. The target is a maximum of 11–13% per state, achieved through growth in six focus states (Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat) plus selective closure of unprofitable pockets in concentrated states. Haryana has been dropped from the focus list.
- Customer leverage is moderate: 30% of incremental portfolio customers have only a Spandana relationship, 31% have one other lender, 25% have two others, and 14% have three or four others.
- Interest rate reduction for loyal customers: The company is already reducing rates for customers in cycle 6 and above, without any formal regulatory communication requiring it. [13-14]
Financial Performance and Margins
- PPOP compression was a DA timing issue: PPOP declined 7% QoQ because direct assignment income fell from INR42 crores in Q2 to INR20 crores in Q3. The balance of the INR56 crores in net gain on fair value changes came from income on free cash parked in liquid funds, mutual funds and FDs, reflecting a higher cash balance.
- Yield decline has multiple drivers: Yield fell QoQ due to continuing leverage improvement over the last year, plus interest income reversals on GNPA (INR6 crores) and the overdue book in the 1–90 day bucket. Interest rates remain unchanged at 25% plus a 1% processing fee.
- NIM was hit by the same factors: Reversals, the overdue book and leverage were the primary NIM drivers; DA preponement of income also had some effect. On a BAU basis, management expects NIM above 13.5% in coming quarters.
- Cost of borrowings: The company is working to reduce its weighted average cost of borrowings to sub-12%.
- Rating upgrades: ICRA and CRISIL both changed their outlook from A stable to A positive. The Criss Financials subsidiary was upgraded by ICRA from BBB+ stable to A- positive.
Guidance & Commitments
| Commitment | Specifics | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Parivartan regularization | 730 Parivartan branches to fully regularize; pain visible for at most one more quarter | 3–4 months |
| FY25 AUM | ~INR15,000 crores | FY25 |
| FY25 asset quality | Credit loss under 2% | FY25 |
| FY25 ROA | 4.5% and above | FY25 |
| FY25 NIM | 13.5% and above | FY25 |
| FY25 ROE | 17% to 19% | FY25 |
| Steady-state opex | Under 6% (5.5% to 6%) | Steady-state |
| Weekly branch disbursement share | 40–45% of disbursements | Same period next year |
| Geographical concentration | No single state above 11–13% of portfolio | Achieved via growth in other states plus selective closures |
| Cost of borrowings | Sub-12% weighted average | Working towards it |
| Legacy credit-cost tail | ~INR60 crores remaining in non-credit loss component | Next 1–3 quarters |
| FY25 recoveries | INR150 crores target | FY25 |
| Vision 28 AUM | INR28,000 crores portfolio | FY28 |
| Non-Parivartan branch conversion | Second wave begins only after current 730 branches fully regularized, with full calibration | After 3–4 months, no fixed date |
| Haryana re-evaluation | Paused; will revisit | 3–4 quarters down the line |
Key Metrics
| Metric | Q3 FY24 |
|---|---|
| AUM | ₹10,404 cr, +52% YoY and +6% QoQ |
| Disbursement | ₹2,543 cr, +8% YoY and +1% QoQ |
| Income | ₹657 cr, +75% YoY |
| Net income | ₹407 cr, +60% YoY |
| PPOP | ₹240 cr, -7% QoQ; decline due to lower direct assignment income (₹20 cr vs ₹42 cr in Q2) |
| PAT | ₹127 cr, +79% YoY and +2% QoQ |
| 9M FY24 PAT | ₹372 cr, surpassing full-year profits of past many years |
| Yield | 24.1% |
| GNPA | 1.61%, up from 1.4% in Q2; 56% of GNPA from Parivartan branches |
| Net NPA | 0.48%, +6 bps QoQ |
| Provisioning coverage ratio | 70.45% |
| Net collection efficiency | 97.2%; gross collection efficiency almost 100% |
| Gross slippages (9M FY24) | ₹113 cr, 1.1% of AUM |
| Credit cost (BAU portfolio) | 1.4% |
| Weighted average cost of borrowings | 12.3% |
| CRAR | 35% |
| Cash and bank balance | ₹1,669 cr |
| Total branches | 1,574, including 375 weekly branches; 72 branches opened in Q3 |
| Weekly branch disbursement share | 16% of total Q3 disbursement (₹407 cr) |
| Weekly branch portfolio | ₹535 cr, net collection efficiency of 99.7% |
| New customer acquisition (9M FY24) | 9.5 lakh, +112% YoY |
| Customer base | ~0.3 cr, +32% YoY and +10% QoQ |
| Top 3 state concentration | 42% of portfolio; top 2 states (MP, Odisha) at 14% each, down from 16.5% at takeover |
| Indebtedness per customer | ~₹34,000, 6–7% lower than industry |
| AUM guidance (FY24 exit) | ₹11,500–12,000 cr |
| AUM guidance (FY25 / Vision 25) | ₹15,000 cr, ~25% growth |
| ROA target | 4.5% and above |
| Credit loss target | Under 2% |
| NIM target | 13.5% and above |
| Opex ratio | 6.6% currently; steady-state guidance 5.5–6% |