Key Takeaways
- Revenue nearly doubled, earnings tripled: Revenue grew 71%+ YoY, EBITDA more than doubled, and PBT grew almost 300%, driven by strong quarter-on-quarter momentum and a premium positioning that insulates margins from inflation.
- Tommy Hilfiger is a rocket, and it is just getting started: The license has already hit its 2026 targets, and management sees a path to ₹400–500 crore from this single brand alone, even as it works to reduce concentration risk.
- The mass premium disruption thesis is the core bet: Signing international fashion brands at price parity with traditional luggage players (e.g., ~₹5,000) is expected to be a "huge growth driver" that could disrupt the industry, and two new brand signings are in advanced talks.
- Under-penetration is the margin of safety: With only ~800 points of sale vs. competitors' 8,000–10,000, the company is so small relative to its opportunity that seasonality does not yet matter, and it aims to double distribution in two years.
- What to watch next quarter: Closure of the two new brand signings targeted by calendar year-end, the outcome of Tommy Hilfiger royalty renewal negotiations, and whether the quarter-on-quarter growth ambition holds through H2.
The Tommy Hilfiger Engine
- Performance has shattered the plan: The company has already achieved the revenue numbers it had committed to deliver by 2026, and management is now revising projections upward for the license renewal discussion.
- Single-brand runway is enormous: Even without new brands, management sees Tommy alone reaching ₹400–500 crore in four to five years, assuming just 5% share of an organized market growing to ₹9,000–10,000 crore.
- Brand protection is the moat: Tommy prioritizes how the brand is treated, protected from overexposure and excessive discounting, and whether the partner understands how to handle a fashion brand. Management believes competitors like VIP or Samsonite are unlikely to seek the license because they are category players, not fashion players, and typically acquire brands outright.
- Royalty renewal is a negotiation, not a given: Management does not see a royalty reduction as a possibility; Tommy is expected to pitch for a higher percentage, and the company is trying to at least get status quo. The license structure runs through Tommy India, with a first term to 2026 and a possible second five-year term after that.
Abhinav Kumar: "I don't see the dearth of growth or the opportunity of growth not being there, even if it is a single brand."
New Brand Signings & The Disruption Thesis
- Two signings targeted near-term: One heavyweight and one lightweight brand are in "very strong discussions," with a target to close by calendar year 2022, within roughly 45 days of the mid-November call.
- The mass premium disruption logic: Signing international fashion brands that offer price parity with traditional luggage brands (e.g., a fashion brand at ~₹5,000 vs. VIP/American Tourister at a similar price) is expected to be a "huge growth driver" that could "disrupt the industry hugely."
- Selection discipline has hardened: After learnings from past brand launches where some succeeded, some failed, and some were given back, the company now applies a "very, very stringent selection criteria" and is focusing primarily on international brands, not Indian ones.
- First-year economics are deliberately conservative: A new brand signed by December 31 will take about six months to get the first product out, making the first year a small one. Management does not expect any new brand to be loss-making in year one; contribution might be low, but existing operations absorb most costs with only marginal incremental expense.
- The go-to-partner strategy: The ambition is to become the go-to partner for accessories for any international brand entering India, creating a portfolio effect that reduces reliance on any single license.
Abhinav Kumar: "We have — I can proudly say this that we have become actually the first choice for any international brand entering into India. We've actually become the first choice in our categories."
Distribution & Channel Expansion
- South India is a new frontier: The company has just opened distribution in South India, a territory where it previously had no stores and no distribution presence, describing it as "almost like a virgin territory."
- Point-of-sale gap is the growth lever: With only ~800 points of sale vs. VIP's 8,000–10,000, management expects to "double or more than double" the current count in two years, and aims to reach 100 store counters by FY25–26, scaling total stores to 200 from 26–27 over three years with ~75% franchisee-owned.
- Online mix is normalizing toward offline: Online contribution in H1 fell from ~55% to 51%, meaning offline growth outpaced online growth, a sign that physical distribution expansion is working.
- Marketplace direct selling adds intelligence and margin: Selling directly on marketplaces as the seller of record, now over 20% of online sales, provides customer insights, enables upselling, and allows control over discounting, which directly adds to the bottom line. These insights will be useful when the company decides to scale its own Bagline.com.
Abhinav Kumar: "So our penetration in itself is so much that I keep telling my team also that for us doesn't make a difference of seasonality. Once we hit INR250 crore INR300 crore then probably the seasonalities and all will start this thing. But right now, I would love to grow quarter-on-quarter every quarter."
Margins, Working Capital & Financial Resilience
- Premium positioning protects margins: The company operates in the premium space, not the mass segment, and premium customers are less sensitive to inflation, so a 10% price increase "doesn't pinch him so hard," insulating the business.
- Working capital is best-in-class: The working capital cycle improved to 77 days, better than VIP at 100 days and Safari at 102 days, driven by inventory at 127 days and debtors at 58 days.
- Cash flow stayed positive even through COVID: The master distributor/regional stockist model, where stock is maintained regionally and money is collected upfront, improved cash flows despite potentially lower margins, and the company was cash flow positive for the past two years.
- No bad debts, proactive risk management: Management took early action on its Central (Future Group) exposure, reducing it from ~₹7.5 crores to a minimal stuck amount of ~₹20–25 lakhs.
- Margin commitment at scale: Even at ₹400–500 crore revenue, management would "at least like to maintain the same" earnings and "won't come down in terms of earnings," though entering mass premium could cause some margin dilution offset by significant volume and value growth.
Supply Chain & Operating Model
- China dependency has been reduced: Pre-COVID, the company was heavily dependent on China for travel gear, but it has since developed Indian factories for hard and soft luggage. India was always the larger source for leather categories.
- Supplier concentration is actively managed: The company divides orders so no single factory gets more than 25–50% of a category's total business, and it is in discussions with suppliers about dedicated facilities and machines with open costings.
- Ecosystem philosophy: Management emphasizes that suppliers understand "we can't squeeze each other, we have to grow up with our ecosystem," and costings are open costings.
- Team depth supports the growth ambition: The COO has 20+ years of retail experience across Shoppers Stop, Landmark Group, and Future Group; the product head has ~8 years with the company; the distribution head previously built business development for a ₹300+ crore company; and the finance head has 20+ years of experience. Management states it is not a one-man show.
Abhinav Kumar: "The costings are open costings. The suppliers understand that we can't squeeze each other, we have to grow up with our ecosystem."
Learnings From Past Brand Launches
- The And/Global Desi lesson: The licenses were let go because handbags are a Western category and consumers did not associate Indian kurti brands with Western handbags, limiting sales outside the brands' own captive stores despite excellent sell-through rates inside those stores. This learning now informs the stringent international-brand-only selection criteria.
- New brand loss risk is contained to inventory liquidation: No new brand will make a direct EBITDA loss in year one because incremental costs are marginal, such as adding 2–3 designers to an existing 10-person team. The only loss risk is if a brand fails and inventory must be liquidated at a discount.
- Forecasting humility: Management acknowledges that "when you sit to plot the numbers on Excel sheet then we get nervous, where have we reached?" reflecting a culture of under-promising while targeting over-delivery.
Abhinav Kumar: "Handbag is primarily a Western category. ... How many Indian potli bag can you sell? ... The consumers were not able to actually marry the two one. A kurti brand selling a Western handbag."
Guidance & Commitments
| Commitment | Specifics | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue growth | Double revenue from last year, barring macroeconomic deterrent | FY23 |
| Medium-term CAGR | 30–35% every year | Next 3–4 years |
| New brand signings | Two brands (one heavyweight, one lightweight) | Calendar year 2022 (~45 days from Nov 15 call) |
| Point-of-sale expansion | Double or more than double from ~800 | Within 2 years |
| Store count | Reach 100 store counters, scale to 200 total | 100 by FY25–26; 200 in 3 years from 26–27 |
| Tommy Hilfiger revenue potential | ₹400–500 crore from single brand | 4–5 years |
| Brand concentration | Reduce Tommy revenue share from 84% to 25% | Long run (Tommy continues growing on its own pace) |
| Margin at scale | At least maintain current earnings levels, not come down | At ₹400–500 crore revenue |
| Tommy license renewal | Pitching for five-year term; status quo on royalty at minimum | Discussions underway; meeting scheduled end-Nov/early-Dec |
| IFF Overseas merger | Under serious consideration, decided purely on merit | No timeline given |
Key Metrics
| Metric | Q2 FY23 |
|---|---|
| Revenue growth | More than 71% YoY |
| EBITDA growth | More than 100% |
| PBT growth | Almost 300% |
| Net profitability growth | Almost 150% |
| Revenue run-rate | Almost ₹150 cr |
| H1 wholesale revenue | ₹76 cr |
| H1 retail value | ~₹150–155 cr (per an analyst's math) |
| Tommy Hilfiger revenue share | 84% of total revenue |
| Online sales contribution (H1) | 51% of total sales, down from ~55% previously |
| Offline sales contribution (H1) | 49% of total sales |
| Bagline (own stores) contribution | 10% of total sales, split ~5% COCO and ~5% FOFO |
| Tommy Hilfiger own EBO contribution | 10% of Tommy Hilfiger sales |
| Marketplace share of online sales | More than 20% of total online sales |
| Inventory days | 127 days |
| Debtor days | 58 days |
| Net working capital cycle | 77 days |
| E-commerce contribution margin premium | 2% to 4% higher than offline contribution margin |
| Tommy Hilfiger royalty rate | 12% of sales (10% royalty plus 2% corporate marketing fee) |
| Tommy Hilfiger contract expiry | December 2023, renewal discussions underway for next five years |
| EBO count | 27–28 stores |
| EBO target by FY25–26 | 100 store counters |
| EBO target in three years | 200 stores, ~25% COCO and 75% FOFO |
| Travel gear product split | 40–45% of product mix |
| Pre-COVID organized accessories market size | ₹4,000–5,000 cr, growing at 16–17% annually |
| Tommy Hilfiger revenue potential | ₹400–500 cr in next four to five years at 5% market share |
| New brand target | One heavyweight and one lightweight brand, targeted for closure in calendar year 2022 |
| Heavyweight brand definition | Potential to cross ₹200 cr retail (₹100 cr wholesale) in four to five years |
| Lightweight brand definition | Potential to reach ₹100+ cr retail (₹50 cr wholesale) in four to five years |
| Tommy Hilfiger 2025–26 targets | Achieved in FY23 |
| Tommy Hilfiger India license renewed by Tommy Europe | Through 2026 |
| Cash flow positive threshold | Achieved at ₹70–80 cr turnover |
| Central (Future Group) debtor exposure | Reduced from ~₹7.5 cr to ~₹20–25 lakh stuck |
| Tommy Hilfiger global brand size | $10 bn worldwide |
| Competitor EBO count (VIP, Safari) | More than 400 each |
| Competitor inventory days (VIP) | 158 days |
| Competitor inventory days (Safari) | 74 days |
| Competitor debtor days (Safari) | 61 days |
| Competitor debtor days (VIP) | 44 days |
| Competitor working capital cycle (VIP) | 100 days |
| Competitor working capital cycle (Safari) | 102 days |
| Tommy backpack price point | ₹2,500–3,000, up to ₹8,000–10,000 |
| Tommy luggage starting price point | ~₹7,000–8,000 |
| Competitor cabin suitcase price (VIP/American Tourister) | ₹4,000–5,000 |
| Competitor backpack price (VIP/American Tourister) | ₹1,100–1,500 |
| Brand Concepts pricing premium vs. VIP/American Tourister | ~40% |
| Discontinued And/Global Desi license annual sales | Almost ₹10 cr plus in the year let go |
| And/Global Desi full-price sell-through | More than 65–70% |
| Global Desi seasonal sell-through | 81–82% |
| And seasonal sell-through | Touching 90% plus |
| Ritu Kumar company size (context for distribution head) | More than ₹300 cr |