Key Takeaways
- A brutal inventory-loss quarter: A sharp PVC price correction collided with high-cost inventory, driving a consolidated net loss and swinging both Pipes & Fittings and PVC Resin segments deep into the red.
- Volumes hit a Q2 record despite the carnage: Pipes & Fittings volumes grew ~7% YoY to 59,218 MT, the highest ever for a second quarter, signalling underlying demand is intact when prices stabilise.
- PVC prices are near a floor, but no bounce in sight: Management believes PVC has almost bottomed out at $810–$830/tonne, yet sees no scope for near-term price increases; the market is stable to weaker.
- The balance sheet is the cycle strategy: With no way to time commodity turns, the company relies on a strong balance sheet, minimalistic inventory and ample cash reserves to absorb shocks.
- What to watch next quarter: How much inventory-loss spillover actually hits Q3, whether the anti-dumping investigation yields concrete action, and if the promised cash return to shareholders gets a timeline.
The Inventory-Loss Mechanism
- Two layers of pain: The quarter’s loss came from (a) selling high-cost inventory at below-cost prices during the quarter, and (b) a quarter-end write-down of remaining inventory to lower market prices per accounting standards.
- Timing made it worse: The jetty closes in Q2, forcing the company to stock up on storage; this quarter’s price fall coincided with that forced inventory buildup, amplifying the damage.
- Pipes & Fittings was not immune: Even though 70–80% of pipe content is PVC, the segment still swung from a ₹57 cr profit to a ₹48 cr loss because input resin is transferred at market rates and sold into declining realizations with a procurement-to-sale lag.
- The spread paradox: An analyst noted the spread between PVC pipe realizations and PVC resin input cost is at a historical high, meaning the input-price reduction outpaced the pipe-price reduction, yet the segment still posted a loss because of the inventory overhang.
- Spillover into Q3: Some inventory-loss effect will continue into Q3, though the major part was absorbed in Q2.
Kedia: “The ability to predict when prices would correct is very difficult.”
PVC Price Dynamics & Global Supply
- Prices have almost bottomed out: Management’s personal view is that at $830–$810/tonne, PVC is near normalised levels; historically it trended at $950–$980 pre-COVID, and not much material downside remains unless global factors worsen.
- But no near-term upside either: Management agreed with an analyst’s view that there is no scope for prices going up in the near term; prices are basically stable or going lower from here, with further correction expected in the next two weeks from the call date.
- The weakness is now global, not just China: Three months ago Chinese dumping was the dominant concern; now US demand is low, US suppliers are quoting low prices for December shipments, and there is oversupply in both the US and Europe.
- China’s carbide-route PVC: A large part of Chinese supply uses coal-based carbide production, a route discouraged globally on environmental grounds. When PVC prices crossed $1,000, this supply resumed; now with low domestic demand in China, material is being dumped outside.
- EDC-PVC spread could normalise: If PVC prices fall below breakeven, producers will curtail supply and prices would tend to correct; the normal spread of ~$550 could return. EDC prices have come down because the caustic soda industry is doing well while PVC demand is low.
- India remains import-dependent: Imports happen because domestic production capacity is insufficient to meet demand. Globally adequate capacities exist, but the business is capital-intensive with high price volatility, so nobody has invested significantly in domestic capacity.
Kedia: “Before 2020, March, I would say. Historically, PVC was trending between $980, $950 and that has been the average for many years. ... we've always been saying that $1,500, $1,600 of PVC that is not sustainable. It was a matter of time when the prices came back to the normalized levels. So, in my personal opinion, these are pretty much there. They have almost bottomed out.”
Segment Performance
| Segment | EBIT (Q2 FY23) | EBIT (Q2 FY22) | Driver |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pipes & Fittings | –₹48 cr | +₹57 cr | PVC price collapse, inventory losses |
| PVC Resin | –₹111 cr | +₹231 cr | High-cost EDC/ethylene inventory against falling PVC realizations |
- Pipes & Fittings volumes were a bright spot: 59,218 MT was the highest tonnage ever achieved in a Q2, growing ~7% YoY despite monsoon typically being a seasonal drag.
- PVC Resin losses were deeper per kg: The sharper EBIT-per-kg drop in resin versus pipes reflects that 70–80% of pipe content is PVC, so the price-drop impact is proportionally lower in the pipes segment.
- CPVC volumes grew sequentially: From ~3,700 tonnes in Q1 to 4,000 tonnes in Q2, despite Q2 being seasonally weak for CPVC due to monsoon reducing construction activity.
- CPVC pricing diverged from PVC: CPVC prices did not fall in line with PVC during the quarter; management attributes this to very few CPVC suppliers globally and low overall CPVC volumes, which allows suppliers to sustain higher prices.
Whabi: “The other reason is that there are very few suppliers of CPVC, so that is why they are able to sustain the higher prices.”
Demand & Channel Health
- Channel inventory is low and staying low: This has been the pattern, and management sees it as a positive setup for demand pull once prices stabilise.
- Demand optimism is price-contingent: With PVC returning to normal levels, management expects demand to pick up; they sense positive vibes from channel partners and believe the sharp, quick price correction is good for the industry going forward.
- Agri demand should respond: With PVC prices coming down, demand pull is expected from the agri side; there is no specific pent-up demand story, just normal price elasticity.
- Non-agri is the strategic focus: Non-agri has been the major focus area for 3–4 years and continues to be the key priority. The initial target is 40% non-agri, with the eventual goal of agri and non-agri contributing equally.
- Second-half volume growth is possible but uncertain: Management sees a possibility of growing YoY on volume in the second half, but added “time will tell.”
Competitive Landscape & Trade Policy
- Unorganised sector is not real competition: Unbranded players have suffered not just this quarter but for the last two years due to PVC price increases and supply disruptions. They can easily close down during difficult times and restart when conditions normalise.
- Anti-dumping investigation is underway: Representations have been made to the government regarding dumping from China; investigations have started and dumping has already slowed down as a result. The industry has also raised the issue of VCM present at more than 2 PPM in certain supplies.
- But action will take time and is unpredictable: Management is sure the issue will be addressed but cannot predict what corrective actions will be taken or when.
- HDP is not a near-term substitute: HDP raw material prices are now similar to PVC after the correction, but HDP usage in India is very limited because it requires special fusion technology not generally available with plumbers.
Whabi: “The unorganized or unbranded have never been the competition. They do have certain volumes of the market, but they have not been the competition. ... it is very easy for such units to just close down during this such difficult time and again, start operating when the times are normal.”
Capital Allocation & Balance Sheet
- Cash return is promised, but not yet timed: Management stated that when the appropriate time comes, if unable to deploy cash in the business, it will be returned to shareholders either as a special dividend or buyback. When pressed on whether it could happen in two quarters, the response was “that is difficult to say.”
- No divestiture or demerger plans: Nothing is under discussion regarding divesting Pipes & Fittings or resin-making operations, or a demerger.
- No CapEx in the PVC segment: No CapEx is planned except for replacement assets; nothing on EDC, ethylene or VCM. The full-year CapEx target of ₹200–250 crores should see a catch-up in the second half.
- The balance-sheet cushion is the cycle strategy: The best way to deal with volatile price scenarios is to have a strong balance sheet with adequate reserves and cash, and to keep a very minimalistic level of inventory, which the company always does. Curtailing resin production is not the answer because of the fixed costs associated with the plant.
- Land sale status: Almost half the land was disposed of in FY22 and all cash proceeds were received before year-end. On the remaining land, nothing has happened; a recent news article was a mistimed report referring to the same transaction concluded in March 2022.
Kedia: “The best way to deal with such a scenario are to my personal opinion. You have to have a cushion in a strong balance sheet. So you have reserves with you. You have adequate cash.”
Guidance & Commitments
| Commitment | Specifics | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Inventory-loss spillover | Some effect continues into Q3, but major part absorbed in Q2 | Q3 FY23 |
| PVC price floor | At $810–$830/tonne, prices have almost bottomed out; not much material downside left unless global factors worsen (management stated INR 81–83/kg, not USD) | Near-term |
| PVC price upside | No scope for near-term prices going up; stable or going lower | Near-term |
| Demand recovery | Demand should pick up as PVC settles at normalised levels | Conditional on price stability |
| Non-agri revenue mix | Reach 40% non-agri initially; eventually agri and non-agri to contribute equally | No date |
| CapEx | Full-year target of ₹200–250 cr, with second-half catch-up | FY23 |
| Cash return to shareholders | Special dividend or buyback if cash cannot be deployed in business | "Within a reasonable time" (no specific quarter) |
| Anti-dumping action | Government investigation underway; some action expected | "Will take time" (no date) |
Key Metrics
| Metric | Q2 FY23 |
|---|---|
| Total income from operations | ₹941 cr, down 13% YoY from ₹1,083 cr |
| EBITDA | Loss of ₹143 cr, versus profit of ₹300 cr in Q2 FY22 |
| Loss after tax | ₹94 cr, versus profit after tax of ₹235 cr in Q2 FY22 |
| Pipes & Fittings revenue | ₹802 cr, down 11% YoY from ₹899 cr |
| Pipes & Fittings EBIT | Loss of ₹48 cr, versus profit of ₹57 cr in Q2 FY22 |
| PVC Resin segment revenue | ₹481 cr, down 26% YoY from ₹654 cr |
| PVC Resin segment EBIT | Loss of ₹111 cr, versus profit of ₹231 cr in Q2 FY22 |
| Net cash surplus | ~₹1,300 cr as on 30 Sep 2022 |
| Pipes & Fittings volumes | 59,218 MT, up ~7% YoY from 55,453 MT |
| PVC Resin segment volumes | 54,633 MT, up 4% YoY from 52,029 MT |
| CPVC Pipe & Fittings volumes | 4,000 tonnes, versus 3,600 tonnes in Q2 FY22 |
| CPVC Pipe & Fittings revenue | ₹170 cr, versus ₹125 cr in Q2 FY22 |
| Fittings volumes | 7,000 tonnes |
| Fittings revenue | ₹200 cr |
| Non-agri volume mix | 37% during Q2 FY23, versus 42% in Q2 FY22 |
| PVC price (end of September) | $900 per tonne |
| PVC/EDC delta (during Q2 FY23) | $600 |
| PVC/VCM delta (during Q2 FY23) | $235 |
| Average PVC price for the quarter | $1,020 per tonne |
| PVC price decline from Q1 to Q2 FY23 | 30% |
| FY23 CapEx target | ₹200–250 cr, largely maintenance; ₹66 cr spent in H1 |