Key Takeaways
- Disappointing quarter, margin collapse: EBITDA fell ~45% YoY to ₹103 crores on flat volumes, with EBITDA/tonne dropping from ~₹1,375 to ₹750. The dominant culprit was power and fuel costs, which alone added ~₹640 of the ₹743/tonne YoY cost increase.
- Demand weakness prevented cost pass-through: Volume growth was only ~1% YoY in the company's southern markets, and heavy July rains made it worse. In markets with good demand, costs were passed on; in Orient's markets, they were not.
- Rajasthan mines restored, Greenfield now real: Mining leases were restored to Orient Cement on exactly the desired terms with no transfer fees, unlocking a long-awaited Greenfield capacity option. Management is cautious on timelines, citing land acquisition as the practical bottleneck.
- Brownfield expansion deliberately slowed: Management is choosing not to start Devapur clinker line construction until the Tiroda grinding unit clearances are secured, pushing the original FY24 timeline out by perhaps six months. FY23 CAPEX will undershoot the ~₹800 crore plan, landing closer to ₹500–600 crores.
- What to watch next quarter: Whether fuel cost softening flows through to P&L after high-cost inventory is consumed, any demand revival post-monsoon that enables price increases, and concrete CAPEX guidance once Rajasthan land and Tiroda clearance timelines are assessed.
Q1 Performance: The Cost-Demand Squeeze
- Volumes stalled: Volume growth of ~1% YoY was described as under par even for Orient's markets, with Telangana, Karnataka, and AP having a very lean quarter. Heavy and excessive rains further softened volumes in July.
- Pricing powerless: Blended realizations rose only modestly, just over 2% YoY and less than 5% QoQ, while total costs rose 20% YoY and 11% QoQ. Low demand and volumes made passing on increased costs very difficult, and operating leverage did not help margins.
- Power and fuel: the dominant cost driver: Power and fuel cost per tonne reached just over ₹1,600, which management claims is among the best in the industry comparatively. The entire cost increase came from the per-kilo-cal blended cost; operational efficiencies were better than the previous quarter.
- Product mix swung toward lower-margin B2B: The B2C/trade segment slowdown was sharper, so volume gains came largely from B2B/large projects where OPC component is higher. This pushed up power and fuel cost per tonne and increased working capital needs via longer credit periods. Blended cement share slipped to just under 60%, with B2B over 40%, a 2–3% swing.
- Inventory and working capital strain: Higher fuel prices inflated inventory values, and the company held more clinker at end of June versus the start of the quarter. Combined with higher B2B sales and lower cash generation, the company drew on working capital limits for ₹160 crores net borrowing, the first such draw in many quarters.
- Rail logistics disrupted: Rail mix dropped to 19% from 25% in Q4 FY22 due to railway prioritization of coal for power plants, rake unavailability, and punitive demurrage and wharfage charges.
- Brand investment continued: Higher advertising and brand-building spend versus the previous two COVID years contributed to other cost increases.
Khetrapal: "It's certainly been a quarter that we at Orient Cement also don't like and I'm sure all of you also don't like... we've been hit badly by obviously the realities in the market."
Khetrapal: "There's no joy when you start seeing the cost of only power and fuel being higher than the total cost of clinker that we've had a few quarters ago."
Rajasthan Greenfield: Mines Restored, Execution Questions Remain
- Mining leases restored on ideal terms: The Government of Rajasthan passed an order restoring mines to Orient Cement Limited from Orient Paper Industries Limited via a simple name change, with no transmission or transfer fees or charges. A formal agreement with the government is yet to be signed, expected in a couple of weeks.
- Greenfield capacity now a real option: With mines restored, the company will start acquiring land and applying for environmental clearances and other authorizations for a Greenfield plant in Rajasthan. Management is tempted to put this on top priority but notes the practical challenges of Greenfield capacity.
- Land acquisition is the bottleneck: Land is under private occupation, and management personally does not expect land to come quickly. Some investment in land procurement may start in the current year, beyond previously indicated CAPEX.
- Timeline realism: Greenfield projects typically take ~5 years from scratch; management will try to expedite and thinks somewhere around 3–3.5 years might be possible, but does not think 2 years is practical.
- Mining start deadline: The government is expected to impose a maximum 3-year constraint to start mining, though authorities have indicated flexibility if they see serious investment intent, but not in writing.
- Sizing caution: Management favors a cautious approach of building a smaller plant first and adding another line if limestone reserves prove sufficient, rather than assuming reserves and putting up large capacity prematurely.
Khetrapal: "I'm delighted to inform all of you that the Rajasthan mines are being restored to us. Exactly on the terms that we wanted, there is a simple change of name from Orient Paper Industries Limited to Orient Cement Limited, there is no transmission, transfer, no transmission, no fee, no charges, nothing at all."
Brownfield Expansion: Deliberately Slowed, Not Stalled
- Devapur clinker line 4 on hold by choice: Management is consciously choosing not to start construction until Tiroda grinding unit clearances are secured. The clinker line will be built in parallel with grinding unit availability, not ahead of it.
- Tiroda grinding unit progress: Railway siding approval and power approval for construction consumption have been received; the company is waiting for MIDC land subleasing permission.
- Timeline slippage: The original estimate of FY24 for Devapur expansion now looks doubtful; management's guess is maybe 6 months beyond the original estimate. Construction time for the grinding unit is 15 to 18 months.
- Rajasthan does not replace Devapur: The two projects are not sequenced against each other. Devapur can start at management's discretion anytime once the grinding unit is confirmed; Rajasthan's timeline depends on government support for land acquisition.
- FY23 CAPEX undershoot: The original ~₹800 crore plan will run short because physical construction for Brownfield capacity has not yet started. Management estimates FY23 CAPEX at ₹500–600 crores at best, if that happens.
Khetrapal: "When we say possible, we perhaps putting it as if we are not able to do it. I'm saying we are choosing not to do it."
Market Strategy: Defending Brand in a Weak, Competitive Market
- Volume strategy forced toward B2B: In a weak demand quarter, the company had to use the B2B segment to maintain capacity utilization, even at lower pricing, to avoid losing operating leverage.
- Trade mix structurally improved: Despite the quarter's B2B skew, the company has reversed its mix from a historical ~60% non-trade / 40% trade to 60% trade / 40% non-trade, even in a bad quarter.
- Strong Crete premium raised: Market response encouraged raising the premium from ₹35 to ₹45 per tonne; the product is now established and consumers recognize its benefits.
- Competitive intensity rising: New capacities in Maharashtra from Shree Cement, Birla Corp, and Dalmia are impacting both volume growth and pricing; new players may take market share even at a loss.
- Brand protection as a deliberate constraint: Management is careful not to dilute brand positioning through short-term price competition, calling it a "very tightrope walk." The company will continue doing only business where a threshold level of realizations and contributions is available.
- Demand trigger delayed: The Kaleswaram Phase 2 project is expected to be a major demand boost when triggered, but may be delayed until the Telangana government rustles up resources.
Khetrapal: "A player like us who's been well established, we will remain very careful about not diluting the brand positioning of ours because in a short-term competition we start diluting a price that you've built up over a long period of time. That's a very, very long-term damage to the company."
Cost and Margin Outlook
- Fuel price softening underway but lagged: Fuel prices have softened \$10–\$20/tonne over the last few weeks; improvement in costs will start kicking in as high-cost inventories are consumed, but a lag is expected. Management says it is unlikely to quickly fall to levels of a few months ago.
- Energy price uncertainty persists: Winter demand for heating in Europe and the Northern hemisphere, plus uncertainty on Russian energy supply, creates uncertainty on whether fuel price softening will sustain.
- Q2 fuel cost flat sequentially: Current costs are high; Q2 is not likely to see any noticeable increase over Q1.
- Pricing recovery hoped for post-monsoon: Management hopes that from Q3 onwards, demand revival will enable passing on increased costs to the market; Q2 will remain impacted by monsoon.
- Competitive intensity expected to normalize: Things will normalize when demand growth meets the new capacity that has come in.
- Waste Heat Recovery plant on track: Proceeding on schedule; will be commissioned within Q4 of FY23, with benefits starting Q1 FY24.
- Fly ash rake handling system: Under construction at Chittapur as per schedule; will be completed within FY23.
Balance Sheet and Funding Discipline
- Leverage guardrails explicit: Debt-to-equity not to exceed 1.5x, debt-to-EBITDA within 3x, at the company level. The top priority is not bringing the balance sheet under stress.
- Dilution ruled out at current valuation: If both Rajasthan and Devapur investments look lucrative, options include equity infusion or a rights issue, but management stated "absolutely not" to dilution at the current valuation.
- Working capital borrowing resumed: The company started drawing on working capital limits from banks after many quarters of not borrowing for working capital, driven by higher B2B receivables, fuel inventory build, and lower cash generation. Project term loan was reduced to ₹259 crores but overall net debt increased.
Khetrapal: "Absolutely not. At the current valuation certainly not."
Guidance & Commitments
| Commitment | Specifics | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Rajasthan Greenfield capacity | Start land acquisition and apply for environmental clearances; management targets 3–3.5 years for completion | Land procurement may start in current year; full timeline to be assessed |
| Rajasthan mining start | Government expected to impose maximum 3-year constraint; flexibility indicated if serious investment intent shown | Within 3 years of formal agreement |
| Devapur/Tiroda Brownfield expansion | Construction starts only after Tiroda grinding unit clearances secured; 15–18 months construction time once started | Original FY24 timeline now doubtful; maybe 6 months beyond original estimate |
| Waste Heat Recovery plant | Commissioning and benefits | Commissioning within Q4 FY23; benefits from Q1 FY24 |
| Fly ash rake handling system | Completion at Chittapur | Within FY23 |
| FY23 CAPEX | ₹500–600 crores at best, down from ~₹800 crore plan | FY23 |
| Balance sheet leverage | Debt-to-equity not to exceed 1.5x, debt-to-EBITDA within 3x | Ongoing |
| Clearer CAPEX guidance | Assessment of Rajasthan government support and Tiroda clearance progress | Next quarter / couple of months |
Key Metrics
| Metric | Q1 FY23 |
|---|---|
| Revenue | up 3% YoY, down 11% sequentially |
| Volume | ~1% YoY, down nearly 12% QoQ |
| EBITDA | ₹103 cr, down from ₹188 cr in Q1 FY22 |
| EBITDA per tonne | ₹750, down from ₹1,384 in Q1 FY22 |
| Total cost per tonne | Higher by ~₹743 YoY, up 20% YoY and nearly 11% over Q4 FY22 |
| Power & fuel cost per tonne | Just over ₹1,600, up nearly 60% YoY from ~₹1,000 |
| Blended realizations | Just over 2% YoY, less than 5% sequentially |
| Trade sales mix | 60% trade, 40% non-trade; a 2–3% swing from B2C to B2B |
| Strongcrete share | 14–15% of volumes; premium increased from ₹35 to ₹45 per tonne over PPC |
| Blended cement share | Just under 60%, B2B a little over 40% |
| West market volume share | 55% |
| South market volume share | 36% |
| Central market volume share | 9% |
| Rail mix | 19% of volumes, down from 25% in Q4 FY22 |
| Fuel mix: domestic coal | ~45% |
| Fuel mix: petcoke | 42% |
| Fuel mix: AFR | 17% |
| Project term loan | ₹259 cr as of June 30 |
| Net working capital borrowings | ₹160 cr drawn from banking system |
| FY23 CAPEX guidance | ₹500–600 cr at best, down from original ~₹800 cr plan |
| Rajasthan planned cement capacity | ~0.2 cr tonnes per year, mine life over 50 years |
| Rajasthan Greenfield project cost | ₹1,500–1,600 cr (per an analyst's math, management said "you're right") |